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Abstract
Despite the creation of a single currency, inﬂation diﬀerentials are still signiﬁcant in the
euro area. In addition country data show that remarkable diﬀerences are still present in labor
and product market institutions across European countries. This paper tries to assess the
link between those two facts. To this aim we use a dynamic general equilibrium model for
a currency area characterized by monopolistic competition and adjustment costs on pricing,
matching frictions and sticky wages in the labor market. We allow for diﬀerences in labor and
product market institutions and show that they can generate high (on impact) and persistent
inﬂation diﬀerentials (hence high terms of trade volatility and persistence) even in presence of
common monetary policy shock and/or symmetric technology shocks. Furthermore we show
that the sensitivity of inﬂation in response to any shock is higher for the country with either the
lower ratio of unemployment beneﬁts to real wages or higher demand elasticity. We reconcile
those facts with VAR evidence for the main euro area countries during the EMU period.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Inﬂation diﬀerentials are still pronounced in European countries despite the creation of a single
currency and the existence of limits on national ﬁscal policies. In addition, remarkable diﬀerences
still exist in national labor and product market institutions. This paper tries to assess the link
between these two facts. As well understood, labor market frictions are an important determinant
of the dynamics of marginal costs of ﬁr m s ,w h i c ha r eam a i nd r i v e ro fi n ﬂation, and product market
regulations aﬀect the response of inﬂation to marginal costs. Hence it seems natural to assess the
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1quantitative relevance of such institutions in determining the diﬀerential inﬂation dynamics across
European countries.
To this purpose we build a dynamic general equilibrium model with two region sharing the
same currency and monetary policy and characterized by a variety of frictions: matching fric-
tions and wage rigidity in the labor market1, monopolistic competition in product markets and
adjustment cost on pricing. We use this laboratory economy to analyze the diﬀerential impact of
common monetary policy and technology shock under diﬀerent types of labor and product market
institutions across the two countries. We identify labor market institutions with unemployment
beneﬁts and product market institutions with the elasticity of goods demand (hence with the prod-
uct mark-up). We calibrate both of them on euro area country data. We ﬁnd that labor and/or
product market institutions are able to generate signiﬁcant and persistent inﬂation diﬀerentials.
This result holds under common monetary policy shocks and symmetric and correlated technology
shocks. Furthermore we show that inﬂation is more responsive in countries with lower levels of un-
employment beneﬁts and higher levels of demand elasticity. We are able to reconcile those results
with evidence obtained by running simple VAR regressions for the main euro area countries during
the EMU period.
The reason for which lasting inﬂation diﬀerentials can be a concern for policy makers is twofold.
First, such diﬀerentials would lead to sustained loss in competitiveness and in national output
growth, possibly harming growth in the euro area itself. Secondly, they might also be a signal of
unwarranted ﬁscal and labor or product market national policies.
Several commentators in the past argued that inﬂations diﬀerentials were due to initial price
and productivity diﬀerentials - i.e. such as the Balassa Samuelson eﬀect -, and that they would have
disappeared once the convergence process was complete. However after ﬁve years from the start
of the EMU inﬂation diﬀerentials still persist and seem to have increased recently. While inﬂation
diﬀerentials among euro area countries declined steadily in the 1990-1999 period, the standard
deviation of the annual growth rates of the HIPC started to pick up again since then. Recent
empirical studies also showed that euro area inﬂation diﬀerentials are higher than those observed
in the U.S. and that factors other than price convergence seem to explain most of the cross-country
diﬀerences.
Fiscal, labor and product market policies are all plausible candidates as factors explaining
inﬂation diﬀerentials. We focus attention on the impact of labor and product market institutions
for a twofold reason. First, labor market institutions have an impact on marginal cost and product
market institutions have an impact on the reaction of prices to marginal costs. Hence both of them
1The tradition of introducing matching frictions in a dynamic general equilibrium model is at this point well
established for closed economy models. Among others see Merz (1995), Andolfatto (1996), Cooley and Quadrini
(2000), Cheron and Langot (1999), Walsh (2002), Krause and Lubik (2003). There is also another line of papers
which introduces diﬀerent types of labor market frictions into DSGE models: among others Danthine and Kurman
(2003), Neiss and Pappa (2002).
2have a direct eﬀect on inﬂation. Secondly, and contrary to other factors, labor and product market
frictions induce ineﬃcient movements in inﬂation, hence they are likely to be undesirable from a
welfare perspective.
We present a unitary framework whose diﬀerent ingredients allow us to address the questions
proposed above. The reason for introducing in the model monopolistic competition and adjustment
cost on pricing a’ la Rotemberg (1982) responds to the goal of studying monetary policy shocks with
non-neutral eﬀects. The typical Phillips curve generated under this assumption links inﬂation today
to future expectations of inﬂation and to a measure of the marginal cost. Introducing matching
frictions a’ la Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) in the labor market allows us to study equilibrium
unemployment in a non-Walrasian economy and to provide a rich dynamics for the formation and
dissolution of employment relations. We enrich the basic matching model with two additional
features which are endogenous job destruction and real wage rigidity. The ﬁrst of the two has been
found realistic in data for industrialized countries2 and improves the persistence in business cycle
models3. The second of the two allows for a muted response of marginal costs4 and helps to recover
the Beveridge curve (the negative correlation between vacancies and unemployment) as noted in
Shimer (2003).
The economics behind the eﬀects of labor market institutions on inﬂation is simple. Unemploy-
ment beneﬁts aﬀect the equilibrium value of a match which in turn aﬀects real wages and marginal
costs. Hence varying unemployment beneﬁts allows for a diﬀerential dynamic of real wages and
marginal costs. Diﬀerent marginal cost dynamics then induce diﬀerent inﬂation dynamics via the
link provided by the Phillips curve.
P r o d u c tm a r k e ti n s t i t u t i o n si no u rm o d e la ﬀect the response of inﬂation to marginal cost.
Higher elasticity of demand implies lower mark-up and higher competition. It also implies a higher
response of inﬂation to marginal costs.
The diﬀerential transmission mechanism also bears some important implications for the open
economy dimension of the paper. Indeed the terms of trade depend from the relative distribution
of work eﬀort across the two regions and from the relative size of the mark-ups. Hence diﬀerential
responses of employment and marginal costs generate endogenous terms of trade depreciation with
shifts in competitiveness across countries.
The paper proceeds as follow. Section 1 reviews the empirical literature on inﬂation diﬀer-
entials and shows some stylized facts on inﬂation diﬀerentials and labor market diﬀerences for
European countries. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 comments on the model dynamics un-
der the assumption that the two countries have symmetric labor and product market institutions.
Section 4 comments on the dynamic properties of the model under the assumption that the two
2See Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuch (1996).
3See denHaan, Ramsey and Watson (1997).
4In this we follow Hall (2002).
3countries have diﬀerent labor and product market institutions. Section 5 concludes. Figures and
tables follow.
1.1 Related Literature and Stylized Facts
There have been recently various empirical contributions on the analysis of inﬂation diﬀerentials in
Europe.
Empirical studies such as Alberola (2000), Rogers (2002) and Ortgea (2003) show that factors
other than the price convergence hypothesis and the Balassa Samuelson eﬀect have played a sig-
niﬁcant role in explaining price and inﬂation divergence in Europe. In particular they stress the
importance of mark-ups and wages diﬀerences as main determinant of the inﬂation diﬀerentials.
On the other side Honohan and Lane (2003) stress the importance of the diﬀerential impact on
diﬀerent member states of the weakness of the euro and of international currency market. A variety
of determinants for inﬂation diﬀerentials are instead considered in an extensive empirical study con-
ducted by the ECB (the “Inﬂation Diﬀerential” report of the 2003). This is a comprehensive survey
of a variety of measures for price and cost developments among the EU-12 during the 1999-2002
period. The authors of the report ﬁnd important evidence of the link between inﬂation diﬀerentials
and diﬀerences in labor costs.
Some papers in the theoretical literature have also approached similar issues. Benigno (2003)
and Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2003) focus on the welfare implications (more than on the causes)
of inﬂation diﬀerentials for euro area countries. Andres, Ortega and Valles (2003) use a two country
model to asses the impact of product market regulations on inﬂation diﬀerentials. Finally Angeloni
and Ehrmann (2004) use a 12-country model to address the impact of various factors on the inﬂation
dynamics. Interestingly they ﬁnd that the presence of inﬂation persistence per se induces inﬂation
diﬀerentials.
Contrary to the majority of previous studies we focus on cyclical inﬂation dynamics and on
their link with labor and product market institutions. Hence to strengthen our motivation we now
document the cyclical behavior of inﬂation and unemployment for the major euro area countries.
Furthermore we present country data on unemployment beneﬁts which show the presence of marked
diﬀerences across euro area members. The same data will also be used in the next sections for the
calibration of our two region laboratory economy.
Inﬂation diﬀerentials. Figure (1) shows the Hodrick-Prescott de-trended measure of the log
changes in CPI inﬂation for the period 1980-2004. We consider the four biggest euro area countries
(Germany, France, Italy and Spain) and a weighted average of the same four countries. From the
graph we can see that the business cycle component of inﬂation for the four countries considered
has converged signiﬁcantly up to the 1998 but is much less synchronized after then. Noticeable is
the strong divergence of the Spanish inﬂation from the euro area average.
4Next we analyze the pattern of rolling correlations of inﬂation, output and unemployment
across the four biggest European countries - i.e. France, Germany, Italy and Spain - for the period
1976-2000. Inﬂation, output and unemployment have been de-trended using a band-pass ﬁlter
- i.e. calculated with Baxter and King (2000) procedure5. Cross-correlations of inﬂation have
converged up to the 1998 but have started to diverge again since then (see (2)). A similar pattern
is observed for the cross-correlation of unemployment - e.g. (3). It is interesting to notice that the
cross-correlations among continental (France and Germany) and Mediterranean (Italy and Spain)
countries is in general lower than the cross-correlations among countries belonging to the same
geographical area.
Labor market institutions. Table (1) shows averages over 1985 to 1995 of beneﬁtd u r a t i o n s
for a series of industrialized countries6. The data show that there is considerable variation in this
measure across euro area countries. In general unemployment beneﬁts range from a minimum of
0.09 to a maximum of 0.78. Diﬀerences in labor market institutions generate of course diﬀerences
in the pattern of unemployment and marginal labor cost.
2 A Model for A Currency Area with Labor and Product Market
Frictions
There are two regions of equal size. Each country is inhabited by a continuum of agents with
measure one. Countries are symmetric for everything apart from the labor and product market
institutions.
Each economy is populated by households who consume diﬀerent varieties of domestically
p r o d u c e da n di m p o r t e dg o o d s ,s a v ea n dw o r k .H o u s e h o l d ss a v ei nb o t hd o m e s t i ca n di n t e r n a t i o n a l l y
traded bonds. Each agent can be either employed or unemployed. In the ﬁr s tc a s eh er e c e i v e saw a g e
that is determined according to a Nash bargaining, in the second case he receives an unemployment
beneﬁt. The labor market is characterized by matching frictions and endogenous job separation.
The production sector acts as a monopolistic competitive sector which produces a diﬀerentiated
good using capital and labor as inputs and faces adjustment costs a’ la Rotemberg (1982).
Let  = {0} denote the history of events up to date , where  denotes the event
realization at date .T h ed a t e0 probability of observing history  is given by . The initial state
0 is given so that 0 =1  Henceforth, and for the sake of simplifying the notation, let’s deﬁne
the operator {} ≡
P
+1 (+1|) as the mathematical expectations over all possible states of
nature conditional on history 
5Data are taken from the ECB MTN dataset.
6Data are taken from Nickell and Nunziata (2001).
52.1 Households in the Domestic and Foreign Region
Let’s denote by  ≡ [(1 − )
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the expected lifetime utility.
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where  denotes aggregate consumption in ﬁnal goods,  is the time spent working,  is an indicator
function which takes the value of 1 if the worker is employed and zero if he is unemployed and  is
the unemployment beneﬁt. The household receives at the beginning of time  a labor income of 
if he is employed, where  is the real wage bill. The contract signed between the worker and the
ﬁrm speciﬁes working time and wage and is obtained through a Nash bargaining process. In order
to ﬁnance consumption at time  each agent also invests in non-state contingent nominal bonds
 which pay a gross nominal interest rate (1 + 

 ) one period later and in non-state contingent
nominal bonds which are internationally traded, ∗
 and which pay a gross nominal interest rate
(1 + 


 ) one period later. As in Andolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995) it is assumed that workers
can insure themselves against earning uncertainty and unemployment. For this reason the wage
earnings have to be interpreted as net of insurance costs. Finally agents receive proﬁts from the
monopolistic sector which they own, Θ and pay lump sum taxes, . The sequence of budget
constraints in terms of domestic CPI consumption goods reads as follows:
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 is the real exchange rate which in the currency area is given by 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Equation (5) gives the optimal choice of labor supply. Equation (6) is the Euler condition with
respect to domestic bonds. Equation (7) is the optimality condition with respect to internationally
traded bonds. Equations (8) is the marginal utility of consumption. Optimality requires that
No-Ponzi condition on wealth is also satisﬁed.
Arbitrage condition and accumulation of assets. Due to imperfect capital mobility
and/or in order to capture the existence of intermediation costs in foreign asset markets workers
pay a spread between the interest rate on the foreign currency portfolio and the interest rate of the
foreign country. This spread is proportional to the (real) value of the country’s net foreign asset
position:
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where 
07, 0 
 0 In addition we assume that the initial distribution of wealth between the two
countries is symmetric. Aggregating the budget constraints of the workers, substituting for (9) and
assuming that domestic bonds are in zero net supply we obtain the following law of motion for the
accumulation of bonds:
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Workers in the Foreign Region. We assume throughout that all goods are traded, that
both countries face the same composition of consumption bundle and that the law of one price
7As shown in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001) and Benigno (2002) this assumption is needed in order to maintain
the stationarity in the model. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001) also show that adding this spread - i.e. whose size has
been shown negligible in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) - does not change signiﬁcantly the behavior of the economy
as compared to the one observed under the complete asset market assumption or under the introduction of other
inducing stationarity elements - see Mendoza (1991), Senhadji (1994), Ghironi (2001).
7holds. This implies that  = ∗
  = ∗
. Under the currency union assumption the
nominal exchange rate is equal one.
Foreign workers face an allocation of expenditure and wealth similar to the one of workers in
the domestic region except for the fact that they do not pay an additional spread for investing in
the international portfolio. The budget constraint of the foreign representative household will read
- i.e. expressed in units of foreign consumption index -:
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The eﬃciency condition for bonds’ holdings will read as follow:
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All other optimality conditions are like in the home region. After substituting equation (9) into
equation (7) and after merging with (7) we obtain the following relation:
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which states that marginal utilities across countries are equalized up to the spread for the country
risk.
2.2 The Production Sector In the Domestic and the Foreign Region
The maximization problem which characterize the production sector are symmetric across the two
economies (they will only diﬀer in terms of their parametrization). Hence in the next section we
show only the ones for the home region.
Firms in the production sector sell their output in a monopolistic competitive market and
meet workers on a matching market. The labor relations are determined according to a standard
Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) framework. Workers must be hired from the unemployment pool
and searching for a worker involves a ﬁxed cost. Workers wages and hours of work are determined
through a Nash decentralized bargaining process which takes place on an individual basis. Finally
the relationship between a matched worker and a ﬁrm can be endogenously discontinued.
2.2.1 Search and Matching in the Labor Market of the Home Region
The search for a worker involves a ﬁxed cost  and the probability of ﬁnding a worker depends on a
constant return to scale matching technology which converts unemployed workers  and vacancies
 into matches, :
( )=

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 (14)
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 =
R 1
0  Deﬁning labor market tightness as  ≡ 
,t h eﬁrm meets unemployed
workers at rate ()=
()
 = 
−
 , while the unemployed workers meet vacancies at rate
()=
1−
 . If the search process is successful, the ﬁrm in the monopolistic good sector
operates the following technology:
  = !"
Z ∞
˜

#
$(#)
1 − %(
˜
#)
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where ! is the aggregate productivity shock which follows a ﬁrst order autoregressive process,
 = −1"  is the number of workers hired by each ﬁrm, and # is an idiosyncratic shock
to ﬁrms which is assumed to be identically and independently distributed across ﬁrms and times
with cumulative distribution function % :[ 0 ∞] → [01] It is assumed that the idiosyncratic shock
is observed before the ﬁrm starts production. The ﬁrm will endogenously discontinue the match if
the realized shock, # is above a certain cut-oﬀ value,
˜
# The threshold for endogenous separation
is determined as a function of the state of the economy using ﬁrms’ optimality conditions. Matches
are destroyed at varying rate (
˜
#) given by the following expression:
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where  is the exogenous break-up rate and 
(
˜
#)=%(
˜
#) is the endogenous break-up
rate.
We are now in the position to determine the law of motion for the workers employed and the
ones seeking for a job. Labor force is normalized to unity. The number of employed people at
time  in each ﬁrm  is given by the number of employed people at time  − 1 plus the ﬂow of new
matches concluded in period  − 1 who did not discontinue the match:
" =( 1− (
˜
#))("−1 + −1(−1)) (17)
Unemployment is given by total labor force minus the number of employed workers:
 =1− " (18)
Finally we deﬁne the gross job destruction rate:
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92.2.2 Open Economy Relations
The consumers and workers maximization problems have been derived assuming normalization to
CPI index since the bundles consumed are aggregates of domestic and foreign goods. On the other
side ﬁrms will deﬂate their proﬁts by referring to the domestic GDP deﬂator. It is necessary at
this point to introduce a series of relationships linking real quantities to the relevant relative prices.
The terms of trade is the relative price of imported goods:
 ≡


(21)
It can be related to the CPI-PPI ratio as follows:
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
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 ]
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T h et e r m so ft r a d ea n dt h ei n ﬂation rates are linked through the following equation:
 =
)
)
−1 (23)
2.2.3 Monopolistic Firms
Firms in the monopolistic sector (of the home region) use labor to produce diﬀerent varieties of
consumption good and face a quadratic cost of adjusting prices. Hours worked and wages are
determined through the bargaining problem analyzed in the next section. Here we develop the
dynamic optimization decision of ﬁrms choosing prices, 
 number of employees, " number of
vacancies,  and the endogenous separation threshold,
˜
# to maximize the discounted value of
future proﬁts and taking as given the wage schedule. Let’s denote the total real wage bill of ﬁrm 
( m e a s u r e di nC P Ig o o d s )b y :
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where (#) denotes the fact that the bargained wage might depend on idiosyncratic shock and
other time varying factors. The representative ﬁrm in the domestic region chooses
n
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to solve the following maximization problem (in real terms):
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 
 represent the cost of adjusting prices, - can be thought as the sluggishness
in the price adjustment process and  as the cost of posting vacancies. Let’s deﬁne ,t h e
lagrange multiplier on constraint (26), as the marginal cost of ﬁrms and . the lagrange multiplier
on constraint (27), as the marginal value of one worker. Since all ﬁrms will chose in equilibrium
the same price and allocation we can now assume symmetry and drop the index . First order
conditions for the above problem read as follows:
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Merging equations (28) and (29) gives the marginal value of an extra worker, . which is
obtained by trading-oﬀ the cost of maintaining the match with an existing worker with the cost of
posting a new vacancy:
. = !&(
˜
#) − (
/*
/"
+

()
(32)
After substituting the marginal value of an extra worker, .into the optimality condition,
(31) and using the constraint which describes the evolution of employment, (27), we obtain the
condition which determines the threshold value for the idiosyncratic shock:
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We can ﬁnally simplify equation (33) so as to obtain a relation between the threshold value
and the real wage schedule:
!
˜
# − (
˜
#)( +

()
=0 (34)
112.2.4 Bellman Equations, Wage Setting and Nash Bargaining
The wage schedule is obtained through the solution to an individual Nash bargaining process. To
solve for it we need ﬁrst to derive the marginal values of a match for the both, ﬁrms and workers.
Those values will indeed enter the sharing rule of the bargaining process. Let’s denote by 0 
 (#)
the marginal discounted value of a match for a domestic ﬁrm measured in terms of domestic prices:
0 
 (#)=!
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# − ((#)+{(
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˜
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#]} (35)
The marginal value of a match depends on real revenues minus the real wage plus the dis-
counted continuation value. With probability (1 − (
˜
#+1)) the job remains ﬁlled and earns the
expected value and with probability, (
˜
#+1) the job is destroyed and has zero value. Using the
equation (34) we can rewrite equation (35) as:
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Since the value of a match for the ﬁrm must be zero in equilibrium the following zero proﬁt
condition must be satisﬁed:
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Equation (37) is an arbitrage condition for the posting of new vacancies. It implies that in
equilibrium the cost of posting a vacancy must equate the discounted expected return from posting
the vacancy.
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where  denotes real unemployment beneﬁts.
Nash bargaining. Workers and ﬁrms are engaged in a Nash bargaining process to determine
wages and hours worked. The standard Nash bargaining problem is given by:
max

¡
((0 
 (#) − 0 
 )
¢ ¡
0 
 (#)
¢1−
(40)
12where 1 stands for the bargaining weight of the workers. The optimal sharing rule is:
((0 
 (#) − 0 
 )=
1
1 − 1
0 
 (#) (41)
After substituting the previously deﬁned value functions it is possible derive the following wage
schedule:
(#)=1(!# + )
1
(
+( 1− 1) (42)
Finally using the individual wage schedule, (42), the condition for the threshold value, (34),
becomes:
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The average real wage is obtained by aggregating across employees:
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Real wage rigidity. From equation (28) we can derive a measure of the marginal cost in our
model which reads as follows:
 =
1
!&(
˜
#)
[
/*
/"
+ . −

()
]
The ﬁrst component of this measure is given by the marginal wage bargained divided by the
labor productivity. Since our goal is to obtain persistent dynamic for marginal cost and inﬂation
we introduce real wage stickiness following Hall (2003). In particular we assume that the individual
real wage is weighted average of the one obtained through the Nash bargaining process and the one
obtained as solution to the steady state:
(#)=[1(!# + )
1
(
+( 1− 1)]+( 1− )(#)
2.3 The Monetary Policy Rule in the Currency Area
An active monetary policy sets the short term nominal interest rate by reacting to an average of
the inﬂation levels in the area. This rule rationalizes the behavior of the stability pact signed by
European countries:


 =e x p (
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) + )∗
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2
)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 (45)
 is the weight that the monetary authority puts on the deviation of CPI inﬂation and is set equal
to 15.  is a temporary monetary policy shock In addition following Clarida, Gali’ and Gertler
(2000) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) we assume that monetary policy applies a certain
degree  of interest rate smoothing. Aside from being consistent with most evidence on monetary
policy rules the interest rate smoothing helps to generate more persistent eﬀect of monetary policy
shocks.
132.4 Equilibrium Conditions
Aggregate output is obtained by aggregating production of individual ﬁrms and by subtracting the
resources wasted into the search activity:
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Market clearing for domestic variety  must satisfy:
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for all  ∈ [01] and . After substituting (47) into the deﬁnition of aggregate output   ≡
hR 1
0 ( 
)1−1
	 
i 	
	−1, imposing symmetry and recalling that  = ∗
, we can express the resource
constraint as:
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We assume zero total net supply of bonds.
2.5 Calibration
Preferences.T i m ei st a k e na sq u a r t e r s .W es e tt h ed i s c o u n tf a c t o r =0 99 so that the annual
interest rate is equal to 4 percent. We set the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign
goods 	 equal to 15 as in Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1994). The parameter on consumption in
the utility function is set equal to one. This value is compatible with a steady state trade balanced
growth path. We set the steady state balanced growth ratio of exports over GDP to  =0 4,v a l u e
compatible with data for European countries. Finally We assume that the steady state net asset
position is symmetric between the two countries. Following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2002) and
consistently with Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002) We set the elasticity of the spread on foreign
bonds to the net asset position equal to 0000742.
Production. Following Basu and Fernald (1997) We set the value added mark-up of prices
over marginal cost to 02 This generates a value for the price elasticity of demand,  of 6 We
set the cost of adjusting prices - =1 0 0to generate a slope of the log-linear Phillips curve equal
14to 0.10 This is compatible with the estimates by Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2003) for France and
Germany.
Labor market frictions parameters. The matching technology is a homogenous of degree
one function which is characterized by the parameter 3 Consistently with estimates by Blanchard
and Diamond (1989) we set this parameter to 06.W e s e t t h e ﬁrm matching rate, () to 07
which is the value used by denHaan, Ramsey and Watson (1997). The probability for a worker
of ﬁn d i n gaj o b ,() is set equal to 06, which implies an average duration of unemployment of
167 as reported ion Cole and Rogerson (1996). With those values it is possible to determine the
number of vacancies as well as the vacancy/unemployment ratio.
We set the exogenous separation probability, ,t o0068 and the steady state overall separa-
tion rate, (
˜
#) to 01 With those values it is possible to obtain the endogenous separation rate,

(
˜
#)=
((
˜
)−
)
(1−
)  and the threshold value,
˜
# = %−1(
) The idiosyncratic shock is distributed as
a lognormal with unitary mean and standard deviation equal to 015
Finally we set the degree of wage rigidity,  equal to 05
Labor market institutions. We need to assign values for the unemployment beneﬁt.
The latter is determined endogenously given the remaining steady state parameters values and
is changed in the simulations. To assign a value to this parameter we follow an indirect calibration
strategy. We calculate the implied values for  and the steady state individual wage schedule  as
function of the remaining model parameters and other steady state variables. We then set a value
of the bargaining parameter, 1 so as to generate values for the 
 ratio which are close to the ones
observed in the data for the four biggest European countries (Germany, France, Italy and Spain).
Data for the 
 ratio are taken from the data-set constructed by S. Nickell and L. Nunziata (2001)
and are reported in table (1).
Exogenous shocks and monetary policy: We consider domestic and foreign aggregate
productivity shocks, ! and !∗
 We follow Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1994) and calibrate their
standard deviations to 0.008, their correlation to 0.25 and their persistence to 0.95. We also consider
an i.i.d. common monetary policy shock,  whose standard deviation is calibrated using data
from Mojon and Peersman (2002). Following several empirical studies for Europe (see Clarida,
Gali’ and Gertler (2000), Angeloni and Dedola (1998) and Andres, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2001)
among others) we set the interest rate smoothing parameter,  equal to 0.8.
All values for the parameters and shocks are reported in Table (2) and (3).
153 Dynamic of Variables Under Symmetric Labor and Product
Market Regulations
It is instructive to start our impulse response analysis by analyzing monetary and technology shock
under symmetric labor and product market regulations. This will indeed allow us to understand
the key mechanisms behind the international transmission of shocks in our model, a key step before
analyzing the sources of inﬂation divergence.
Figure (4) shows impulse responses of several domestic and foreign variables to a common
monetary policy tightening. Since the two countries are perfectly symmetric and since they are
subject to the same shocks the dynamic pattern of all variables is perfectly symmetric as well. For
the same reason we do not observe movements in the terms of trade.
In response to a monetary policy tightening output and employment decrease in both countries.
Both variables show a hump shaped dynamics with employment falling considerably more than
output. This is due to the fact that the increase in the optimal threshold value for the idiosyncratic
shock preserves ﬁrm-worker matches. The survival of worse matches also induces a decrease in
t h er e a lm a r g i n a lc o s t sw h i c hi nt u r ni n d u c e sad e c r e a s ei nr e a lw a g e sa n di n ﬂation. The decrease
in employment is accompanied by an increase in unemployment and job destruction. The latter
is due to the increase in the endogenous separation rate. Due to the wage rigidity ﬁrms face an
incentive to decrease the number of vacancies which therefore move oppositely to unemployment
(phenomenon known as Beveridge curve).
Figure (5) shows impulse responses of several domestic and foreign variables to a domestic raise
in aggregate productivity. Obviously since we are now examining an idiosyncratic shock we observe
asymmetric responses across the two countries and considerable movements in the terms of trades.
We start by analyzing domestic variables. Output raises. On the other side employment falls. This
is due to the sticky prices assumption which leaves aggregate demand unchanged thereby reducing
the need for labor input in correspondence of a raise in productivity. The fall in employment and
labor input is followed by a fall in marginal cost, which in turn reduces real wages and inﬂation.
Finally the increase in the domestic endogenous separation rate and the drop in domestic vacancies
induce an increase in unemployment.
Under a domestic productivity shock the dynamic patterns of the foreign variables is the result
of two competing eﬀects. First of all, the fall in the inﬂation of the home region shifts consumption
demand from domestically to foreign produced goods (switching expenditure eﬀect). This implies
a depreciation in the terms of trade (a loss in competitiveness for the foreign country), a fall
in foreign consumption demand and a fall in foreign inﬂation. This detrimental eﬀect is partly
to fully compensated by a beneﬁcial eﬀect generated by the endogenous reaction of the common
monetary policy (the monetary transmission mechanism).S i n c e i n ﬂation falls in both countries
the common monetary policy authority reduces the nominal interest rate thereby boosting foreign
16output and employment. The raise in foreign employment induces also a raise in foreign real wages
and marginal costs.
4D i ﬀerential Inﬂation Responses Under Common Shocks and
Diﬀe r e n tL a b o ro rP r o d u c tM a r k e tR e g u l a t i o n s
W ea r en o wi nt h ep o s i t i o nt oa n a l y z et h ed i ﬀerential impact on inﬂa t i o na n dl a b o rm a r k e tv a r i a b l e s
generated by the shocks under the assumption of diﬀerent labor and product market regulations.
4.1 Varying Unemployment Beneﬁt Across Countries
Figure (6) shows responses to a common monetary policy shock for foreign and domestic CPI inﬂa-
tion levels, the inﬂations diﬀerential (measured by the absolute diﬀerence between CPI inﬂations)
and the marginal costs diﬀerential under three diﬀerent labor market scenarios for the home coun-
try corresponding to three diﬀerent levels of unemployment beneﬁts. The calibration of the labor
market scenarios follows the one presented in table (3). In particular increasing levels of bargaining
power are associated with decreasing ratios of unemployment beneﬁts to real wage for the home
country.
The impulse responses show that two countries have marked diﬀerences in inﬂation dynamics.
In the third the inﬂation diﬀerential can reach a pick on impact of about 2.7 percentage points
and can last for a to 4 years (16 quarters). The inﬂation diﬀerential as well as the marginal cost
diﬀerential is big on impact and persistent. The reason for this being as follows. The decrease in
demand - due to the negative monetary policy shock - has a diﬀerential impact on the value of a
match depending on the deep parameters that characterize labor market institutions. The diﬀerent
degree of sensitivity of the value of a match generates diﬀerential responses of real wages, marginal
costs and therefore of inﬂation.
Another important implication of the model is that countries with lower ratios of unemploy-
ment beneﬁts to real wages (typically Italy and Spain) tend to have marginal cost and inﬂation
which respond more to aggregate shocks. In general the sensitivity of the inﬂation response is nega-
tively correlated with the ratio of unemployment beneﬁt to real wages. This is so since higher levels
of bargaining power induce higher levels of real wages (hence lower ratios of unemployment beneﬁts
to real wages) and more pronounced real wages and marginal costs dynamics. As a consequence
inﬂation dynamics become more sensitive to aggregate shocks as well.
Figure (7) shows responses to a common technology shock for foreign and domestic CPI inﬂa-
tion levels, the inﬂations diﬀerential (measured by the diﬀerence between CPI inﬂations) and the
marginal costs diﬀerential under the labor market scenarios considered in table (3).
Once again the two countries show marked diﬀerences in inﬂation and marginal cost responses.
17As before the country with the lower level of unemployment beneﬁt shows higher sensitivity of
marginal cost and inﬂation to aggregate shocks. However now and contrary to the previous case
inﬂation diﬀerentials are lower on impact and more persistent. The inﬂation diﬀerential reaches
a maximum pick of 0.2 percentage points in the third scenario and last for about 10 years (40
quarters).
4.2 Varying the Elasticity of Demand Across Countries
We analyze now inﬂation and marginal cost diﬀerentials in response to a change in the elasticity
of varieties. This parameter is used as a proxy for the degree of product market competition. We
identify the diﬀerent product market scenarios by ﬁxing the elasticity of the foreign country to 4
and by varying the elasticity of the home country from 6 to 10. Lower demand elasticity generates
higher mark-ups hence lower competition.
Figure (8) and (9) show the impulse responses to common monetary policy and technology
shock respectively for foreign and domestic CPI inﬂation levels, for the inﬂations diﬀerential (mea-
sured by the absolute diﬀerence between CPI inﬂations) and the marginal costs diﬀerential under
the three diﬀerent product market scenarios.
Under both shocks there are marked diﬀerences in the dynamic paths of inﬂation across the
two countries. Under monetary policy shocks the inﬂation diﬀerential can reach a pick of about
2.4 percentage points under the third scenario and can last for a to 4 years (16 quarters). Under
productivity shocks inﬂation diﬀerentials are lower on impact and more persistent. They indeed
reach a pick on impact at about 0.31 percentage points and last for more than 10 years.
Under a monetary policy tightening the decrease in demand associated with sticky prices
induces an increase of the mark-up and a decrease of the marginal cost and of inﬂation. Clearly
the higher is the elasticity of demand (more competitive product markets) the higher is the fall in
the marginal cost and in inﬂation.
With an increase in productivity there is a fall in labor demand which induces a decrease in
the marginal cost and in inﬂation. Clearly the higher is the demand elasticity (more competitive
product markets) the higher is the fall in the marginal costa and in inﬂation.
In general we can conclude that the response of inﬂation to any type of shocks is more pro-
nounced in countries with higher demand elasticity (hence with higher competition).
5 VAR Evidence for The Main Euro Area Countries
One of the model predictions concerned the relation between the sensitivity of the inﬂation in
response to monetary policy shocks and the labor market institutions. In particular our model
predicts that lower levels of unemployment beneﬁts are associated with higher sensitivity of inﬂation
in response to monetary policy shocks.
18To verify whether our predictions is conﬁrmed by the data we run simple VAR regressions
for each of the four biggest euro area countries (Germany, France, Italy and Spain) during the
EMU period which we set between the 1998 and the 2004. Given the scarcity of data in our short
sample we run simple VAR’s with few variables. The vector of endogenous variables8 consists of
real GDP,   consumer price index inﬂation, ) and the euro area short term nominal interest rate,


 9. Data are in levels, quarterly and seasonally adjusted. For the monetary policy shock we use
standard identiﬁcation strategies as in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999). The euro area
monetary policy shock is identiﬁed through a Choleski decomposition with the variables ordered
as follows:
2 =[  )

 ]
The underlying assumption is that policy shocks have no contemporaneous impact on output
and inﬂation. Figure (10) shows impulse responses of real GDP and inﬂation for all the four
countries considered. Conﬁdence bands generated through monetcarlo simulations. As expected in
all countries inﬂation and output decrease in response to a monetary tightening.
It stands clear that the inﬂation responses in Italy and Spain are much stronger (in terms of
magnitude) than the ones observed for Germany and France. We can also recall from table (1)
that Italy and Spain have levels of unemployment beneﬁt (0.09 and 0.26 respectively) which are
much lower than the ones observed for Germany and France (0.61 and 0.49 respectively). From
those two observation we can conclude that our model replicates fairly well the VAR evidence for
euro area countries. Indeed the model predicts that countries with lower levels of unemployment
beneﬁts tend to show higher sensitivity of inﬂation response as opposed to countries with higher
levels of unemployment beneﬁts.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Inﬂation diﬀerentials should be a main concern for the newly created central bank for two reasons.
First, they lead to sustained diﬀerences in competitiveness which might eventually harm price
stability. Secondly, whenever they occur on top and above the ones associated with productivity
diﬀerences, they might signal diﬀerences in eﬃciency of labor and product market structures due
to inappropriate national policies.
This paper aims at studying the quantitative importance of labor and product market dif-
ferences in generating diﬀerential inﬂation dynamics across euro area countries. It is indeed well
understood that labor market frictions are an important determinant of the dynamics of marginal
costs of ﬁrms, which are a main driver of inﬂation, while product market regulations aﬀect the
response of inﬂation to marginal costs. We ﬁnd that even in response to common shocks diﬀerences
8Due to the scarcity of data we use the least possible number of variables in our VARs.
9F o rt h i sv a r i a b l ew eu s et h et h r e em o n t hm o n e ym a r k e tr a t e .
19in both types of institutions can generate signiﬁcant inﬂation diﬀerentials. Furthermore we show
that the sensitivity of inﬂation in response to monetary and technology shocks is higher under
either lower ratios of unemployment beneﬁt st or e a lw a g e so rh i g h e rd e m a n de l a s t i c i t y .
Inﬂation diﬀerentials due to productivity catch-ups should not be a concern for monetary policy
since they are transitory and since they are associated with eﬃcient reallocations of resources or
international competition. On the contrary asymmetric development in labor and product market
institutions are linked to various sources of ineﬃciencies which might be welfare detrimental for
the entire currency area as well. For this reason a micro-founded model like the one used here
could be used in the future also to answer questions on the welfare gains from diﬀerent structural
reforms. These issue, already relevant today, will become much more pressing in the future, when
the euro-zone will include new entrants from eastern Europe.
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22Table 1: Masures of unemployment beneﬁts. Average over 1985 to 1995.
Countries Beneﬁt Duration
Austria 0.75
Belgium 0.77
Denmark 0.78
Finland 0.53
France 0.49
Germany 0.61
Ireland 0.54
Italy 0.09
Netherlands 0.47
Portugal 0.60
Spain 0.26
Table 2: Model parameters and shock calibration.
Parameters and shocks Mnemonics Values
Workers Discount factor  0.99
Elasticity of home and foreign goods 	 1.5
Parameter on consumption utility  1
Matching function parameter 3 0.6
Share of exports over GDP  0.2
Elasticity of spread to bond accumulation  0.000742
Matching rate () 0.7
Exogenous separation rate  0.068
Endogenous separation rate (#) 0.1
Elasticity of variety demand  6
Prices adjustment cost - 17.5
Wage rigidity  0.5
Standard deviation idiosyncratic shock  0.15
Persistence of area wide monetary shock  0
Standard deviations of area wide monetary shock  1.0007
Persistence of technology shocks  ∗ 0.95
Standard deviations of technology shocks ∗ 0.008
Correlation of technology shocks 45( ∗) 0.25
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Figure 1: CPI inﬂation quarterly log change Hodrick-Prescot de-trended. Period 1980-
2004.
24Figure 2: Rolling correlation of inﬂation for main EMU countries calculated with band
pass ﬁlter from Baxter and King (2000) and with a window of 20 years. Period 1976-
2000.
Table 3: Calibration of the labor market scenarios.
Labor institution parameters Mnemonics Foreign country Home country
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Baragaining power 	 020 30 50 7
Unemployment beneﬁt over wage 
 0.9 0.84 0.67 0.34
25Figure 3: Rolling correlation of unemployment for main EMU countries calculated with
band pass ﬁlter from Baxter and King (2000) and with a window of 20 years. Period
1976-1998.
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Figure 4: Impulse responses of domestic and foreign variables to a monetary policy
shock. The y-axis reports percentage deviations from the steady state, while the
x-axis reports years after the shock.
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Figure 5: Impulse responses of domestic and foreign variables to a domestic technology
shock. The y-axis reports percentage deviations from the steady state, while the x-axis
reports years after the shock.
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Figure 6: Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock for diﬀerent values of the
unemployment beneﬁt.
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Figure 7: Impulse responses to a technology shock for diﬀerent values of the unemploy-
ment beneﬁt.
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Figure 8: Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock for diﬀerent values of the
demand elasticity.
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Figure 9: Impulse responses to a technology shock for diﬀerent values of the demand
elasticity.
32Figure 10. VARS for Germany, France, Italy and Spain for the period 1998-2004. 
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